From the beginning of Northern Ireland's Troubles, two different strands of British intelligence were developed in Northern Ireland that failed to effectively cooperate or coordinate their efforts with one another. Though central government was aware (and often opposed) the lack of singular control over intelligence in the province, they were unable to wrest control of security intelligence from the hands of the Army and Special Branch. This problem, meant that a Security intelligence 'stovepipe' emerged and that this stovepipe operated without reference (and at times in opposition) to policy initiatives also being pursued by the UK government at the time.
Stovepiping intelligence
The problem of intelligence 'stovepipes' was first officially conceptualized in a 1996 US Congress Select Committee study describing the circumstances in which various forms of intelligence (and their collection disciplines) are managed so separately that they become virtually independent from one another. 1 The problem with stovepipes being that lateral movement or the sharing of intelligence, skills, or even opinions between the variously tasked institutions becomes impossible or is at least frowned upon because of 'the fact that each discipline is managed with a great deal of independence from the others' . 2 Though the problem of intelligence stovepipes was illustrated in this 1996 report, it was not tackled with any urgency in the US until the 9/11 Commission Report demonstrated clearly that the issue had become acute and had contributed toward the intelligence failures surrounding the 9/11 attacks of 2001:
The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the government is currently structured. Lines of operational authority run to the expanding executive departments, and they are guarded for understandable reasons: the DCI commands the CIA's personnel overseas; the secretary of defense will not yield to others in conveying commands to military forces; the Justice Department will not give up the responsibility of deciding whether to seek arrest warrants. But the result is that each agency or department needs its own intelligence apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is hard to "break down stovepipes" when there are so many stoves that are legally and politically entitled to have cast-iron pipes of their own. 3 The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), established three new institutions in the US that hoped to prevent the emergence of stovepipes among the US intelligence community in the future. These are and remain the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the US Joint Intelligence Community Council and the National Counterterrorism Centre and all have the express function of ensuring intelligence is shared among those who require it, both analysts and policymakers, so that the problems associated with intelligence stovepipes can be minimised.
In Britain, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has, since 1936, theoretically ensured intelligence is shared among managers across the intelligence community by drawing on all available intelligence as well as diplomatic reporting and open source intelligence. The JIC has its own assessment staff and secretariat and meets weekly in a committee made up of the heads of all UK services (Defence Intelligence, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) along with senior officials at the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. However, as with the DNI in the United States, the JIC does not have any direct control over the agencies who supply it with intelligence, nor do they have any indirect power over budgets in order to influence the intelligence agencies who remain under the direct control of their parent government departments. Tradition, wisdom, and professional courtesy aside, therefore Britain's intelligence community has always remained susceptible, theoretically, to the stovepiping of its constituent agencies most especially when their own interests have been at stake.
Examples exist of stovepiping in many modern and historic counter insurgency campaigns and are clearly apparent in the effect of so-called 'surge' strategies used in both Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2009) . 4 In both these instances, military primacy and the adherent demand for actionable military intelligence has served to delegitimise other areas of state activity and deprive these other authorities of access to information that they might have used effectively to inform policy development. Stovepipes develop therefore even if the ultimate long-term goals of all organisations, generating, analyzing and disseminating intelligence remain the same and, when active participants in a conflict, can even serve as spoilers, actively preventing the emergence of nascent peace processes by too aggressively pursuing an enemy that other components of the state are attempting to draw away from a conflict.
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The UK's response to Northern Ireland's civil rights crisis
The separate and divergent strands of intelligence in Northern Ireland emerged from the UK government's response to the unique character of the conflict and the way in which it emerged in the late 1960s. The widely publicised injustices and discrimination against the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland were acknowledged (if not resolved) by a series of piecemeal reforms of the Unionist NI Prime Minister Terence O'Neill. This led to a degree of instability among both the Catholic working class and more radical left wing groups in Northern Ireland who felt these reforms were not enough. In response those in the Protestant, Unionist and Loyalist working class felt the civil rights campaign was a cover for a resurgence of Irish republicanism and undermining the union with Britain. By 1968, increasingly radical groups of civil-rights activists under the umbrella of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) were seeking an end to official discrimination against Catholics by way of their three main demands:
(1) The end of the rate payer's franchise and its replacement by universal suffrage at local government elections (the demand known as 'One Man, One Vote'). (2) The introduction of anti-discrimination legislation covering public employment. (3) The repeal of the Special Powers Act that had been used to curtail political opposition movements since the establishment of the state. 6 The aims of the Civil Rights Movement were vehemently opposed by increasing numbers within the majority unionist community including members of Northern Ireland's cabinet. Loyalist paramilitary groups also began to emerge and their campaign of violence began with their first murders in May 1966. 7 Although British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had been aware of the issues surrounding the civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland since at least the UK general election of October 1964. 8 Once he was elected UK prime minister in 1964, Wilson's practical understanding of the problem led him to prevaricate, rather than take action on the matter. Thus, Wilson avoided the issue in public and kept his growing concern a largely private matter. Where discord happened, it did so behind closed doors.
Symptomatic of Wilson's early approach was his response to a meeting between Eddie McAteer (leader of the Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland) and Lord Stonham (Minister of State at the Home Office) which raised the issue of how UK troops would be controlled if called to assist the Northern Ireland government in November 1968. 9 Wilson responded quickly 10 but quietly to ensure that all British Army units would refer to the Ministry of Defence, 'before acceding to any request for use of troops in aid of the civil power' . 11 Wilson reason to distrust the Northern Ireland government, who had form in exaggerating the threats there. During the spring of 1966 for example, he had agreed to the supply of troops in order to prevent what PM O'Neill had privately warned would be a large scale Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign similar to a previous campaign begun in 1956 . 12 Nothing of the sort envisaged in O'Neill's letter however took place though it emerged later that the Northern Ireland government had been planning a swoop of IRA suspects using Special Powers legislation all along. This report's author, soon-to-be Chief of the General Staff Sir Geoffrey Baker worried that this kind of act, 'would lay us [i.e. the UK government] open to blame for provocation of any disturbance or violence that might follow these arrests' . 13 In August 1969 therefore, when the request for help from the military was finally made, the British Army was introduced to aid the Northern Ireland government, but was controlled solely by London. Seen initially as non-partisan by the nationalist/catholic community, a brief honeymoon period saw not only the Army beginning to gather its own operational intelligence (e.g., on planned demonstrations) but also delve into peace building by exploiting political contacts closely linked with local defence and paramilitary groups. One such example was the so-called 'Sullivan-Dyball treaty' of September 1969 14 in which a group of Catholic vigilantes in Belfast agreed to remove their barricades and combine their patrols with the British Army but to the exclusion of the RUC. 15 Civil servants as well as troops were sent as the British government increased the amount of monitoring of the Northern Ireland government in this time. Indeed, as early as 21 April 1969 a Cabinet Office committee had instructed the Joint Intelligence Committee to consult with the Home Office 'on the means for obtaining information other than through the Northern Ireland official sources' . 16 This led to the Security Service (MI5) sending over a Security Liaison Officer (SLO) to supplement the existing tiny coterie investigating loyalist groups and create a more direct link with RUC Special Branch that would report both on the security threat and on the police's performance in dealing with it. The MI5 SLO became Britain's first independent source of information in Northern Ireland (independent that is from the Unionist Northern Ireland Government though still reliant on the RUC) and a key part of what the JIC chairman Sir Edward Peck described as the 'slightly better intelligence service on Northern Ireland' . 17 In August, reporting was increased again when, alongside the troops, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) supplied Oliver Wright, a senior diplomat, for the newly formed post of 'UK Representative' in Belfast. Finally, on 28 August, the General Officer Commanding [GOC] (Lt. Gen Sir Ian Freeland) was granted a Director of Intelligence (DI) responsible to him, but in 'close touch with Mr Oliver Wright' .
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These parallel and overlapping appointments -made in haste during a period when it was uncertain how long the crisis would last -were the ad hoc foundations upon which the security and intelligence stovepipe would soon be built.
From peace keeping to counter insurgency, Northern Ireland 1969-1973
The further deterioration of Northern Ireland's security situation following the honeymoon period from August 1969 to roughly March 1970 is well documented elsewhere 19 though it remains important that the key mile stones are pointed out as it was the changing nature of the conflict that made the intelligence reporting structures (described above) so inadequate so quickly. Following the initial deployment of troops in order to stop the civil rights crisis turning into a sectarian feud, the IRA split into its 'Official' and 'Provisional' wings in December 1969 with the Provisional IRA in particular vowing to go on the offensive now that British troops were on the streets. 20 By April 1970 the GOC, faced with nightly riots in Belfast and Derry coincidental with an ever stiffer army resolve that exacerbated the violence they faced, warned that rioters armed with petrol bombs could be shot dead, though the response more usually consisted of the firing of CS gas. 21 By June, gun and bomb attacks, by both wings of the IRA had begun to supplement and replace the riots as the main threat to the British Army. Therefore on 3 July 1970, in order to seize these weapons the British Army effectively imposed a curfew on the Catholic Falls Road in Belfast to conduct house to house searches, in doing so alienating the local populations permanently.
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By 1971, despite many of the political reforms demanded by the Civil Rights Campaign having been conceded, the security situation continued to decline and internment without trial was introduced for suspected IRA members and other political radicals. The backlash against the internment policy continued for months, and the British army's operations increasingly took on the complexion of a classic Counter Insurgency until, on Bloody Sunday (30 January 1972) 13 civilians were shot dead at an anti-internment March in Derry, and a full-blown insurgency for a period arguably began. The Stormont Government was suspended in March 1972 and Direct Rule of the province was imposed by the British government.
Direct Rule alone did not create stability or improve security. By the end of 1972, 212 members of the Security Forces, 113 paramilitaries and 366 civilians 23 had died in the Northern Ireland Troubles since the deployment of troops to aid the civil power there in 1969. Of these, 300 had been killed in the nine months following Direct Rule. Recent academic debate on the nature and severity of sectarianism within the IRA might disagree on a number of issues, 24 but a broader consensus has emerged that the IRA consciously targeted 'individuals whom they deemed to be in some measure actively contributing to persisting British control in Ireland' . 25 The Army still had the role of peace keeper between Loyalist and Republican armed groups, but were being targeted in particular by the resurgent Provisional IRA as part of a renewed war for Irish unification. Thus the intelligence the security forces sought was influenced by their own urgent need for effective defence. The product generated therefore needed to be practical, urgent and actionable when it came to the identities and activities of republican paramilitaries, whether or not these were representative of the conflict as a whole, and without reference to the potential for that intelligence to be useful to those outside the army or police who were seeking political ways that the conflict might be brought to an end. This short-sightedness is illustrated by Eunan O'Halpin, who has highlighted both the severity of the security threat loyalist paramilitaries posed as well as the degree to which the JIC ignored that threat. 26 But the JIC were merely at the end of an intelligence stovepipe that considered reporting to the JIC often irrelevant and who were consistently overlooking the wider political utility of their product, perceiving the conflict solely (and erroneously) as being one between the Provisional IRA and the British state alone. By mid 1972 therefore the reality was that the initial mission of the army to aid the civil power in Northern Ireland and restore law and order to the province had been replaced by a more urgent need to defeat the IRA. The change in the nature of the deployment thus led to a change in the aims of the forces deployed. Just as Mockaitis argues that a change in circumstances can lead to a change in the understanding of what constitutes minimum force in an insurgency 27 so too this change in aim did not need to be reflected in any formal adjustment to the intelligence arrangements for Northern Ireland in order to have taken place. Security intelligence was naturally shaping itself to meet the demands for usable intelligence from the Security Forces themselves -in other words doing what they perceived to be their job. Thus, a security intelligence stovepipe emerged that was more sensitive to the needs of its immediate consumers than to any other aspect of the state's response.
Northern Ireland's security stovepipe
The security stovepipe emerged as a result of the posting of the MI5 Security Liaison Officer (SLO) assigned to RUC Headquarters in April 1969 and who was joined from August 1969 by increasing numbers of military intelligence personnel who, in turn were coordinated by the Director of Intelligence (another MI5 officer) appointed at the end of that month. However, whilst MI5 could claim to have been there first, the GOC (Freeland) in order to stop the Northern Ireland Government from gaining operational control over the British Army was given full control over all security matters in the province as soon as troops were deployed and this control extended to all the existing intelligence systems. The post of Director of Intelligence had even been established at Freeland's request, his having told the Chief of the General Staff that he, 'would welcome a Director of Intelligence … who would be answerable solely to him' . 28 Freeland's choice of words were reflected in the new Director of Intelligence's Terms of Reference which began, 'You will be responsible to the GOC …' 29 Thus, the SLO, Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) and even much of RUC Special Branch initially were under Freeland's operational control 30 which could only have had a detrimental impact on morale within police Special Branch. Within days of their arrival however, the domestic situation had improved to such an extent that there was relatively little to report on and, as late as October 1969 even future MI5 Director General (DG) Stella Rimington admitted that her information coming from Northern Ireland -while significant in size -'did not at this stage contain much in the way of real intelligence' . 31 So too, the JIC in London strained to hear information from the Director of Intelligence that had been appointed in Belfast, largely because he was now responsible to the GOC. The JIC requested weekly assessments, that were reduced to fortnightly, and when even these were not forthcoming, Sir Martin Furnival-Jones, the MI5 DG was asked to see if the DI (an MI5 officer after all) required 'secretarial support' . 32 The JIC secretary, Brian Stewart, responded in October 1969 with the establishment of a Northern Ireland Current Intelligence Group which would in theory give the RUC Special Branch direct representation at the JIC 33 though little changed as a result. Another reason for the lack of reporting and liaison likely originated in the confused nature of the initial deployment. MI5 and the British Army were used to working with each other and alongside local police special branches in colonial conflicts in Malaya, Kenya, Aden and Cyprus and had come to prioritize the building of these relationships above the reporting demands of a far-off Whitehall particularly as the GOC was so often given blanket control over security. Imperial conflicts rarely garnered the kinds of day-to-day headlines the crisis in Northern Ireland had and rarer still had they threatened the security of mainland Britain so readily as Irish republicans. Therefore the intelligence officers there may have been less aware of the JIC's (and the Cabinet's) concern. Still, as time went on, it became clearer that the JIC had a real problem in obtaining regular intelligence assessments from the Director of Intelligence there. MI5's Director General, Furnival-Jones was again in Northern Ireland in January 1970 34 and, following a brief respite, it was apparent that the system of reporting had again begun to break down. In June 1970, another draft assessment was late at the exact moment that the security situation began deteriorating once more. 35 By October, with the honeymoon now completely over, the JIC moved to expand their Current Intelligence Group by replacing the original Director of Intelligence by the newly arrived SLO, David Eastwood MC. 36 While the JIC worked to build up a new system of reporting, they also began to acknowledge the limitations of using the Director of Intelligence's reports as an all-source analysis even changing the name of the Northern Ireland Current Intelligence Group to the Ireland Current Intelligence Group, to denote sources of intelligence presumably now arriving from beyond Northern Ireland. 37 A change of personnel however did not change the problem of non-reporting from the Director of Intelligence and twice in October assessments or commentary were, once again, late in coming from Belfast. 38 In March 1971 the JIC again reviewed the intelligence arrangements for Northern Ireland and the Intelligence Co-ordinator, Sir Dick White was sent over and reported back. 39 Although White's report (drafted by JIC Secretary Brian Stewart) 40 remains classified, excerpts from it do appear in the archives and its recommendations clearly influenced future considerations of both the introduction of internment and the risk of a Protestant backlash should the Northern Ireland Government be replaced by Direct Rule from Westminster. 41 White auspiciously noted, 'It is important to emphasize that there was not an intelligence crisis in Northern Ireland' . 42 Before writing that RUC Special Branch was, 'the crux of the machine' and that as a result of it being 'the object over the last two years of close scrutiny and heavy criticism, it was thus in a highly sensitive state' . 43 White believed therefore that there were 'weaknesses in the direction, collection and collation of security intelligence' within the RUC though still, he felt able to conclude that however much we improve our own arrangements, there cannot be a consequential radical improvement in the intelligence situation as a whole [without RUC SB improvement] … the army's contribution is probably only about 10% of the total intelligence take -the balance being principally from RUC SB. 44 In further excerpts from White's actual report two recommendations appear. The first, was that whilst it was important that there should be 'a better balance between the two partners in the overall intelligence system in Northern Ireland … it will be imperative to carry the Northern Ireland police with us and retain every bit of their confidence' 45 in the event of Direct Rule. Second, was that once the intelligence was in a state that would enable it and, 'after a lull in its expectation, an internment policy could be expected to yield considerable intelligence dividends' . 46 White's report effectively tied the hands of the JIC, MI5 and even the British Army. By emphasizing both their importance and fragility of RUC Special Branch White was making it clear that no one could afford to upset them and that Special Branch could not be made to report back to the JIC if they were unable to do so for any reason. This problem of a non-reporting RUC Special Branch, whether it stemmed from inadequacy or a more general unwillingness to co-operate 47 only got worse over time and, as the casualty lists mounted, both the military and police commanders involved might well have felt reporting to Whitehall came a poor second to gently squeezing out of the RUC the operational and actionable intelligence that the Security Forces needed for themselves.
Perhaps nowhere are the limits and inadequacies of the security intelligence set-up in Northern Ireland more evident than in Operation Demetrius, the introduction of internment, which took place on the morning of 9 August 1971. The arrest operation, furnished by intelligence gathered predominantly by RUC Special Branch netted 342 of the 520 suspects on their list in the first 24 h. 48 Evidence of success however was an illusion with 105 of the 342 lifted on the first night being released within two days and, as time went on it emerged that the list was both inflated and out of date including a number of members of left-wing organisations 49 as well as long-retired former republican paramilitaries.
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Richard English would later estimate that 'Fewer than a hundred of [those arrested initially] were either Provisional or Official IRA Volunteers' . 51 And even Prime Minister Ted Heath, though himself initially convinced of the operation's success later admitted that the intelligence supplied by RUC Special Branch had proven to be 'hopelessly out of date' .
Though the Director of Intelligence had no responsibility for the arrest lists, or subsequently who was selected for the enhanced interrogation methods 53 that would prove so controversial; it is clear that the implementation of the recommendations Dick White had made in March was at least partly the DI's responsibility and he was drawn into the maelstrom of controversy that emerged once word that the 'Five Techniques' 54 had been used got out in the autumn of 1971. For example, under arrangements made by the DI a group of at least ten RUC interrogators had been trained at the Joint Services Interrogation Wing at Ashford, Kent since White's report in the spring. However, even some in the army were questioning the wisdom of handing over such an 'exceptionally sensitive' operation to the RUC, urging the DI to 'strongly advise' the RUC that they follow the JIC directives on interrogation laid down in 1965 'to provide at least some cover to reduce the inevitable recrimination' . 55 Though no indication of this advice being passed on to the RUC has been identified, its relevance rings true in the minority report of the Parker Committee (the second of two government inquiries conducted on the issue in its immediate aftermath) where Lord Gardiner concluded:
The blame for this sorry story … must lie with those who, many years ago in decided that in emergency conditions in Colonial-type situations we should abandon our legal, well-tried and highly successful wartime interrogation methods and replace them by procedures which were secret, illegal, not morally justifiable and alien … 56 Despite the controversy, some justification might still have been found had there been an 'operational dividend' from using the Five Techniques and reports were submitted in defence of the methods based on their results in terms of the operational intelligence they had gathered. This, ends justifying means argument, included the details of planned IRA operations, IRA order of battle and the location of arms caches and safe houses. According to one report, the techniques had resulted in 'over 40 outstanding major incidents [being] cleared from Police records' . 57 Most apparent however is the positive effect of the internment policy on army morale and confidence. That the army felt that they were now winning the war of attrition after August 1971 is sustained by their own internal communications if not by the incident statistics which showed the IRA were becoming more rather than less active. 58 The opportunity to participate more actively in the conflict may have given the troops a better sense of purpose but it did little to shorten or ameliorate the conflict at this point.
Caught in the middle however, the DI, Eastwood, became exhausted by the pressure of his office. Following yet another visit from Dick White in November 1971, a direct and urgent request was made to the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend asking that MI5 insist on Eastwood accepting another assistant immediately. White told Trend that, 'as soon as the Security Service reinforcement gets going it should be possible to persuade [Eastwood] to a further break' 59 so exhausted the DI had become since internment began.
In a number of respects, the internment policy and its results can be seen as a case study in stovepiped intelligence failure. After the initial operation, the optimistic army reports meant for the internal consumption of the managers within the security forces hid the external controversy and two British Government reports 60 into internment only served to make security intelligence even more defensive about its product, activities and outcomes. Beyond increasingly strained attempts at pinning the IRA down there is little to no consideration in these documents of intelligence serving any wider, political or strategic purpose (these separate efforts will be explained below). Furthermore, the attempts to shield the strategic failure of internment by promoting its operational success did little to convince anyone outside the police and army that internment had meant they had turned a corner in the conflict. Finally, the reluctance of RUC Special Branch to resort to the Five Techniques further after August 1971 61 indicates that even they were unconvinced the same intelligence could not be gathered by less controversial means and subsequently for a time restricted their use of even the new interrogation methods for fear of prosecution. 62 The political failure however was most obvious and the policy led directly to the escalation of republican violence in Belfast and Derry and an increase in support for the IRA throughout Ireland. McCleery has recently demonstrated that the conflict emerged for the first time on any meaningful scale in the towns of Lurgan, Newry, Dungannon and Enniskillen during the backlash against internment. 63 None of this was an unanticipated consequence, it had for example been clearly spelled out in a warning from Britain's ambassador in Dublin that once internment was introduced, 'all the moderates would identify with the internees' . 64 Subsequently the ambassador wrote directly to the UK Representative in Belfast, Howard Smith, asking that Protestant extremists be included and that once republican ring-leaders had been rounded up the army should 'operate with as light a touch as possible' 65 cognisant of the propaganda effect the policy was already having in the south.
Political intelligence In Northern Ireland
The well documented failures of the security forces to stem a rising tide of violence in Northern Ireland in this period are not reflected in the performance other areas of the UK government's deployment. Howard Smith as UK Representative (UKREP) was not a part of the security intelligence stovepipe that had emerged around the Director of Intelligence, the army and RUC Special Branch. The Office of the UKREP, had been established at the behest of PM Harold Wilson to monitor the implementation of internal reforms by the Northern Ireland government after the deployment of troops there and was led between 1969 and 1972 by a series of three senior diplomats, Oliver Wright, Ronnie Burroughs and Howard Smith. These UKREPs had a more general reporting role as well and began almost immediately to seek out the opinions of those beyond the unionist government at Stormont. Though largely using open source or freely given information, the UKREP was effectively gathering and analyzing political intelligence and was in the process of creating channels of information on Northern Ireland that were uniquely detached from sources supplied by or through the Northern Ireland government. The letters, reports and despatches of the UKREP were distributed around the 'Irish Net' at Whitehall (clearance coded 'PERIMETER' to exclude Northern Ireland officials from reading them) and this included all the same people privy to the security intelligence reporting. 66 These political intelligence reports however began to diverge from security intelligence perceptions from the summer of 1971 over the issue of internment and their analyzes of its success. Howard Smith, was the final UKREP (a Bletchley Park alumni, later ambassador in Moscow and MI5 DG 1979-81) and urged caution over the perceived efficacy of internment just weeks before its introduction when he wrote to the Home Office, 'I do not believe that internment alone in Northern Ireland would do the trick … [as] in my judgement a considerable capacity for terror would remain' .
67 Similar opposition was voiced by MI5 who advocated the internment of loyalist paramilitaries as 'a sop for the minority community' and its application over only the Greater Belfast area. 68 With internment in place and the army reports now conflating their own increased COIN success with an actual decline in the insurgency, opposition from the UKREP only increased with the appointment of MI6's Frank Steele as Smith's deputy in October 1971. Steele took a practical and ecumenical approach to the post of Deputy UKREP, later justifying his methods on the basis that on a recent posting to Kenya he had worked with Jomo Kenyatta ('one of our staunchest friends in the world') who had previously been interned by the British because of his 'links with the Mau Mau' prior to Kenyan independence. The Mau Mau, according to Steele, 'made the IRA look like a Sunday school choir' therefore, 'to people like me it seemed just pragmatic to talk to the IRA' . 69 Within a fortnight of his arrival Steele was reporting valuable news from moderates within the nationalist community, who were directly contradicting the army's line that they were winning, 'they [the moderate nationalists 70 ] themselves were not as optimistic about this … [and] they also commented that [the army] were not taking sufficient care in winning the security battle to minimize the political damage incurred in doing this' . 71 The difference in approach between the approach of the UKREP group and the MI5/Military Intelligence/RUC group is perhaps best illustrated in the treatment of the PIRA Adjutant Frank Morris on 9 February 1972 when he reported to Victoria RUC Barracks in Derry. There, Morris delivered a message from PIRA Chief of Staff Sean MacStíofáin proposing a truce between the IRA and the British Army. The Director of Intelligence added comments to the minute, 'This approach must be viewed in the context of increasing security force pressure on the IRA in Belfast where I expect their activities to be reduced to a minimum in six to eight weeks' time' . 72 The contact with Morris was subsequently allowed to lapse. In contrast, following similar contact that spring Frank Steele was to organize talks that resulted in a PIRA ceasefire and, after talks with the Secretary of State at Cheyne Walk in London when the IRA delegation was led by MacStíofáin.
Before his death in 1997, Steele made clear how stark the differences were between the views of political intelligence and security intelligence at this time when he told journalist Peter Taylor;
There was very little coordination of whatever intelligence was being produced by the RUC, the army and MI5. Internment had been a disaster. It barely damaged the IRA's command structure and led to a flood of recruits, money and weapons. It was a farce. And as for the special interrogation techniques, they were damned stupid as well as morally wrong. Such methods are counter-productive and do you enormous damage when they get out, which they inevitably do. And in practical terms, the additional usable intelligence they produced was, I understand, minimal.
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The JIC and intelligence arrangements in Northern Ireland after direct rule Following Bloody Sunday, the advance toward Direct Rule was swift. But whilst little changed in the overall intelligence arrangements initially, within a few months the new Northern Ireland Office began to seek greater civilian control over the very security matters that had been withdrawn from the Northern Ireland government in 1969. The NIO began making its case to the JIC for greater input and access to intelligence in mid-April 1972. The NIO, arguing, It is certainly the case that the D of I could not have been responsible to the civil authorities in NI before direct rule … [although] intelligence is valuable not only to the army: it is also a source of essential information for policy-making. 74 The origin of the NIO was closely linked to the Office of the UKREP though for a brief time in 1972 both operated in parallel. Howard Smith and Frank Steele therefore both remained for a time working in the offices of the UKREP at Laneside on the shores of Belfast Lough 75 though they now reported to the Secretary of State. Halliday of the NIO believed the information this group collected and the good counsel they provided could be leveraged by further access to security intelligence and he continued this logic, 'It can therefore be argued that the DofI should be made as responsible to the Secretary of State as he is to the GOC' . 76 The Chiefs of Staff however had claimed control over the Director of Intelligence in their rewriting of the GOC's directive as director of operations just five days before Direct Rule was imposed, clearly describing the DI position once again as being under the GOC;
Your dealings with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (or where appropriate his senior representative in Northern Ireland) on intelligence matters will be direct or by your Director of Intelligence acting for you. 77 This memo, approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 27 March, (i.e., the day before Direct Rule came about) was an attempt to get ahead of the Northern Ireland Office laying any claim over intelligence, as the post of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland did not yet exist when the document was written and approved. However, whilst few in either the JIC or the NIO felt that the Secretary of State required more than consultation on intelligence matters initially 78 this began to change as the weeks went by.
By May 1972 it became apparent that the proposed terms of reference for the Director of Intelligence would not be approved by the NIO unless significant changes were made. A note by Denis Trevelyan at the NIO to his Permanent Under-Secretary Sir William Nield spelled a different stance from that taken in April, arguing the system might be geared 'towards providing political as well as the more conventional military and security intelligence' . Trevelyan argued that using the Official Joint Security Committee in Belfast to select targets for intelligence collection and supplying 'Mr Steel (sic)' with 'a good deal of "raw" material in addition to prepared assessments' . 79 Nield responded with an 'urgent request' to London that partly resulted in the establishment of an Irish Joint Section staffed by both MI5 and MI6 personnel. 80 Had this proposal been accepted fully however it would have placed Frank Steele at the heart (if not the head) of intelligence in Northern Ireland demoting significantly the Director of Intelligence, David Eastwood. The proposal would not only replace the Army with the NIO as the lead intelligence customer, but also a seconded officer from MI5 with one from MI6 (i.e., Eastwood would be replaced by Steele) as the lead provider of that intelligence. The disagreement undoubtedly led to delay as the secretariat of the JIC drafted and redrafted several new terms of reference through May and June 1972. 81 Meanwhile, the brief PIRA ceasefire from 26 June to 9 July 1972 demonstrated the efficacy of the parallel diplomacy and political intelligence that Steele had been conducting since October 1971 82 and at a time when otherwise, 'the security forces and intelligence services were in some disarray, and were losing control in Northern Ireland' . 83 Knowledge of the NIO's role in talks with the IRA further fuelled the NIO's argument to replace Eastwood as DI. At the JIC however Defence Intelligence Chief and Deputy JIC Chair, Air Marshal Sir Harold Maguire along with Lt Gen Willison and MI5, successfully argued for more emphasis to be given to operational intelligence on the IRA. 84 Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend intervened to form a sub-committee that would ordinarily have been chaired by the Intelligence Co-ordinator but in whose absence, Maguire of Defence Intelligence chaired. Maguire tabled a proposal creating the post of Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) that would replace the DI but who 'should not be burdened with responsibility for political or psychological warfare' . 85 This adjustment effectively ended the NIO's attempts to access security intelligence and within a month, a designate DCI from MI5 was appointed and was briefing the JIC on his plans. Unexpected ill health and the inability of MI5 to find someone senior enough to take his place 86 however meant this plan backfired and, by happenstance, Alan Rowley from MI6 was chosen instead and sent as the first DCI in October 1972.
The director and co-ordinator of intelligence
British Intelligence in Northern Ireland in the Autumn of 1972 faced a series of scandals and failures which, along with being politically damaging, claimed the lives of civilians as well as its own personnel and all of which can be linked back to the activities and requirements of military intelligence. From October to December 1972, the Littlejohn Affair, followed by the Wyman/Crinnian affair were both linked to the Ministry of Defence 87 who were running formal and informal agents inside the Republic of Ireland. A number of deaths were also linked to the patrols of the Military Reaction Force (MRF) 88 and whilst these were established for the purposes of covert intelligence gathering under each brigade in Northern Ireland, some acted in ways reminiscent of the counter-gangs used against the Mau Mau in Kenya and parallels have been repeatedly drawn since. 89 Add to this the PIRA counter intelligence success of the Four Square Laundry operation and it is clear these were dire days for security intelligence in Northern Ireland. 90 Senior figures within the NIO along with Allan Rowley as the new DCI were aware of these failures and their damaging political implications as they largely ended during his term. The MRF was disbanded in early 1973 and Rowley worked closely with the NIO and the FCO as well as successfully opening channels of direct communication with the Irish government and, on occasion, their own security forces. This cooperation extended to providing leads the Irish could act upon to both seize weapons (e.g., the seizure of the Claudia arms shipment from Libya in 1973) and providing information regarding IRA bomb making to the Irish Defence Forces' bomb disposal unit. 91 Rowley had a gregarious personality and moved his office to Stormont itself which, along with his 'good fellowship and calmness' , 92 allowed him to cooperate and therefore co-ordinate intelligence in Northern Ireland better than his predecessor. In time, Rowley developed trust between the political and security intelligence units that had not existed before and although the structural problem remained (with one group in control of security intelligence and another group the political side of the conflict) Rowley allowed them to communicate, at least informally. Although no evidence of how Rowley was perceived within the police or the army has been identified, the use of internment more selectively (and directly by the Secretary of State) from late 1972 until 1974 meant that 'virtually all the detainees were members of the IRA and that the MOD had more faith in the RUC SB intelligence' 93 by the time the practice ended. 94 so that political talks might again begin. However, the ceasefire, monitored by incident centres run by both the NIO and Sinn Féin, provided evidence over a number of months that the security forces were not keeping the NIO's side of the agreement and that the stovepipe had returned. Ryder and more recently Ó Dochartaigh have found that not only were direct orders to soft-pedal ignored, but continued (and at times increased) security force patrols and checkpoints were specifically designed to interfere with the NIO's ceasefire talks. 95 For Ó Dochartaigh. 'Ongoing pressure from the RUC and the British army made it extremely difficult for the republican leadership to restrain local units from what those units characterized as defensive or retaliatory action and strengthened 'spoilers' within the republican movement' . 96 The NIO incident centres in fact recorded 967 complaints about Security Force activity from February to October 1975, (though the Security Forces used the same system to complain about republican activity 400 times) 97 and this exacerbated tension between the political intelligence units at the NIO and senior elements of the Army and MoD. The tension is most apparent in the fact that the DCI is left out of NIO correspondence chains regarding alleged Security Forces harassment circulated internally, an issue that demonstrates the re-emergence of a stovepipe separating the political from the security responses following Rowley's departure. The longest note not made available to the DCI for example, accuses The Second Battalion The Parachute Regiment ('2 Para'), then stationed in North Belfast, of 'over playing their hand' and of being unsuited to improving community relations. The note presented excerpts from some of the '15 complaints of assault, mostly serious, in the 6 weeks from 12 July [1975] ' . 98 The author concluding, 'As you know we have suggested a "horses for courses" approach to the MoD in the posting of roulement battalions in Northern Ireland. Their reply was predictable but disappointing' . 99 With Rowley gone, the Terms of Reference of the DCI were in themselves not capable of maintaining the kind of cooperation the first DCI had managed to achieve between military and political intelligence. The new DCI, Denis Payne, moved out of Stormont and back to the army's HQNI at Lisburn's Thiepval Barracks (where Eastwood had previously been stationed in 1971) and the stovepipe in which the security and operational intelligence of the RUC Special Branch and Military Intelligence returned. The return of the post of DCI to an MI5 officer might have been crucial to this silo mentality re-emerging. The role of MI5 as a security organization is undoubtedly different from the more active and inquisitive MI6 approach, and perhaps implies a more urgent and defensive approach to intelligence gathering. These two cultures created two divergent systems in Northern Ireland with one often attempting to explore the means by which the conflict might be resolved, the other being determined to prosecute that conflict and having an indirect but detrimental impact on the other's approach.
Conclusions
The security intelligence stovepipe is undoubtedly important in explaining how security policy developed along the lines that it did Northern Ireland. Whilst the NIO and successive Secretaries of State recognized that their role often required them to act as both mediators and participants in the conflict, 100 the severity of the violence from 1970 meant that it is understandable that Security Force lives were prioritised by other members of the Security Forces over potential peace-feelers from the PIRA. The escalating nature of the conflict increased the desire of the Security Forces to pursue and fight what they deemed a criminal enemy, and the British Army and RUC needed to maintain a close working partnership between their respective intelligence operations despite evident tensions between them. 101 Both the RUC and military security intelligence operations sidelined policy intervention from above (the JIC) and from the Northern Ireland Office following Direct Rule in 1972. This marginalised the approaches of political intelligencers operating at Laneside. While security intelligence is a part (however crucial) of any reasonable explanation for the eventual end to the conflict in Northern Ireland 102 these two approaches to intelligence need not have been considered mutually exclusive and recent research has tended to emphasize how predictable the unintended consequences of counter terrorism policies that do not pay attention to political realities really are. In the Northern Ireland case the radicalisation of Catholic Irish Nationalists after the Falls Road Curfew in 1970, the introduction of internment in 1971, 103 and Bloody Sunday in 1972 104 famously radicalised whole sections of their community. Indiscriminate counterterrorism killings as well led only to increased overall PIRA bombings. 105 This in turn amplified the need for more security intelligence which led, among other things, to the abandonment and closure of Laneside and the advent of Police Primacy as a policy in Northern Ireland in 1976. It would take over a decade for the kind of joined-up thinking which married social, economic, political and security policy reforms at the NIO to develop. 106 It was hoped this would create a situation in which the IRA and others could see how entering mainstream politics could be more beneficial to their cause than continuing with violence. When this approach emerged in the 1990s the change was relatively swift.
The security stovepipe arguably had little to fear and much to gain even if political intelligence could only help induce occasional PIRA ceasefires. By the 1990s certainly this was one important area in which MI5 played an important part 107 and the PIRA campaign as a result gradually flickered and stuttered its way into obsolescence. That the stovepipe was not only allowed to exist but accommodated, despite the brief successes during Alan Rowley's time as DCI, demonstrates that while the NIO lost the argument over who should control intelligence they had shown the effectiveness of coordinating the political and security intelligence efforts. By working to breakdown the security intelligence stovepipe, Rowley had briefly demonstrated the effectiveness of all-source and all-service co-operation toward the shared goal of bringing about an agreed and favourable end to the conflict in Northern Ireland.
